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Mao’s specific brand of political
violence
Michel Bonnin
1 I  thank Anne Cheng for  giving me the opportunity  to  exchange with distinguished
Asian scholars on a topic which I often broached with my students, especially during
those last years of my teaching on the Cultural Revolution at the Chinese University of
Hong Kong, but on which I have never written a specific paper. 
2 When Anne asked me if I would like to speak about political violence, I immediately
thought that Mao Zedong was a perfect choice to illustrate the topic, since political
violence was central to Maoism, both theoretically and practically. Not only was he
convinced  of  its  absolute  necessity,  but  he  had  an  exceptional  talent  for  creating
situations in which all forms of violence could emerge, proliferate and develop to the
full. In this paper, I can only give an overview of the topic. I shall first briefly present
the different types and the main examples of Maoist violence as they appeared all along
the  political  life  of  this  eternal  revolutionary.  I  shall  give  more  details  about  the
Cultural Revolution and will then try to determine the specificity of Maoist violence,
reflect  on its  role  in Mao’s  political  system and finally  ask whether this  specificity
makes him more or less criminal than other dictators of the 20th century. 
 
I. “Revolution is not a dinner party”
3 As a communist revolutionary, Mao considered violence as necessary for the toppling
of what he called the half-capitalist,  half-feudal system in his country.  The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) founded in 1921 tried to imitate the Soviet Party, but it had to
fight 28 years before gaining power in 1949. During that time, it was not able to foment
a revolution among workers  in  the  cities,  but  had to  retreat  in  rural  mountainous
regions  to  create  rural  Red zones  and fight  against  the  attacks  of  the  Kuomintang
(KMT) army led by Chiang Kai-shek. Finally, thanks to the Japanese invasion, the KMT
had to make an alliance with the CCP, which survived and prospered during the war
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and, after it was over, was able, with the help of the Soviet Union, to defeat the KMT
and take power.
4 Mao became the leader of the Party during the difficult period of the Long March. He
was able to stabilise his position in the Red zone of Yan’an by using a mix of political
violence against potential rivals (denounced as traitors) and political indoctrination to
convince the rank and file that he was a saviour and that they had to obey him, lest
they become “counter-revolutionaries”. Mao at that time was very much inspired by
Stalin, but the methods he used were not entirely those of Stalin. They were influenced
by the examples of mass violence that Mao had observed in February 1927 during the
Peasant Movement in his native province of Hunan. In the Report he later presented to
the Central Committee of the Party, you can find a highly positive description of the
collective humiliation, beatings and killings of landlords and other “class enemies” that
he had observed and a  passionate  plea  for  supporting this  kind of  “revolutionary”
actions. The most famous sentence in this report, which became a Maoist maxim and
was  chanted  frenetically  by  the  Red  Guards  during  the  Cultural  Revolution  was:
“Revolution is not a dinner party”. 
 
II. After 1949: government through movements
5 After  the  revolution  of  1949,  Mao  copied  the  Soviet  system  and  inherited  all  the
Stalinist organs of repression: secret police, Party controlled judiciary, labour camps,
etc. He also had a Propaganda Department which transmitted to the cadres and the
population his latest directives and a bureaucracy in charge of their implementation.
But,  in  the  “socialist  transformation”  of  the  country,  he  relied  mainly  on  “mass
movements”.  Those  so-called  “mass  movements”  are  not  to  be  confused  with
spontaneous social movements. All of them were organised and manipulated by the
Party,  which  sent  special  “work  groups”  to  the  grassroots,  when  the  local  Party
committee  was  considered  as  an  insufficient  force  to  lead  the  movements.  Those
movements were all directed at “enemies of the people”, which were to be denounced
first by the local or sent down authorities, but also by the rest of the population. The
participation of the masses was important to justify the movement, to isolate those
targeted and to give the false impression that it was spontaneous. In each case, it was
considered essential that the “enemies” reflect on themselves and present an apology
before  receiving  their  punishment.  These  self-confessions  were  generally  obtained
under duress, ranging from endless harassment and detention to downright physical
torture. 
6 The first  mass movement after the establishment of  the People’s  Republic  of  China
(PRC) was the Land Reform. One of the rationales of the Revolution was to liberate the
peasants from the landlords and rich peasants, so that ordinary peasants should have
enough land to  sustain  themselves.  In  the  history  of  China,  peasant  rebellions  had
rarely  been  directed  against  other  peasants,  including  the  landlords.  They  were
directed against the state (whatever its form), because it imposed taxes. So, the land
reform had to be set up and manipulated by scores of Party members, who were sent to
the countryside. Very often, they had to force the peasants to take part, organising
rehearsals and promising advantages to the most zealous activists. But after some time,
existing resentment against  the formerly rich and powerful,  as  well  as  the hope of
obtaining part of their land were enough to guarantee participation and even zeal. In
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fact,  the methods used during the land reform were largely  based on the methods
lauded by Mao in his Report of 1927. The result was violent, with probably two million
dead or more, and the creation of a new pariah class in the countryside which would be
systematically  discriminated  against  until  Mao’s  death.  It  included  not  only  those
members  of  the  “four  black  categories”  who had survived,  but  also  their  children.
Featuring in  this  group were quite  a  number  of  people  who should not  have been
included but were victims of misunderstandings or personal revenge by some activists.
Through the land reform, the Party had sealed a blood pact with the peasantry.  In
exchange of their participation, the activists became local leaders of the Party and most
peasants obtained more land to cultivate. Unfortunately for them, the land was taken
back by the authorities after a few years and became the property of collective entities
controlled by the Party, the cooperatives and later people’s communes.
7 Other mass movements of the 1950s and 1960s were more or less organised on the same
model, but after the consolidation of the Party structure, the Party committees were
more active and the participation of the masses, although important, was less violent,
the worst violence being the privilege of the official organs of repression. A special
attention, however, should be given to the most lethal “mass movement” orchestrated
by  Mao,  and  probably  by  anyone  ever  in  world  history:  the  Great  Leap  Forward
launched in 1958. Paradoxically this movement was not, at the start, targeting physical
enemies,  but  was  a  huge  mobilisation  of  the  whole  population,  especially  in  the
countryside, to make agriculture and industry leap forward. The problem is that the
whole rural society was reorganised along Mao’s fanciful ideas in order to extract from
the peasants an amount of labour never witnessed before. The extremely optimistic
economic  targets  fixed  by  Mao  as  well  as  the  ways  to  attain  them  were  totally
unscientific, and the result was an incredible waste of resources and human labour,
which triggered the biggest famine in the history of humanity (at least 35 million dead).
Mao had pressured all provincial cadres to accept those ridiculous targets. The problem
could have been much less severe if Mao had accepted at the Lushan Plenum in 1959 to
change his policy. But, confronted to the reality of the famine by a private letter from
the Minister of Defense, Peng Dehuai, he denied it and accused those who pleaded for a
change of orientation of being rightists. For the peasants dying of hunger, there was no
way out, since they were prohibited to leave their villages, contrary to what had always
been the surviving practice in history. And, since Mao needed to find scapegoats for the
catastrophe that he had brought to his country, he declared that “class enemies” had
infiltrated the local rural cadres, and had sabotaged the Great Leap. This is why among
the 35 million dead or so, about two million did not die of hunger and exhaustion like
the  others  but  were  local  cadres  executed  as  “counter-revolutionaries”,  generally
because they had alerted the higher authorities about the terrible plight of their fellow
peasants. The Great Leap, then, shows that Utopia, when it is imposed by a dictator
through violent means, can be even more dangerous than political violence launched
against specific enemies.
 
III. The Cultural Revolution: the richest period for
political violence
8 Although the  Cultural  Revolution (officially  the  period from 1966  to  1976)  was  not
quantitatively as lethal as the Great Leap Forward, it is qualitatively the richest period
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as regards political violence, especially during the years 1966-1971. This revolution was
a kind of unidentified political object, which was planned and launched by Mao Zedong.
It was a purge, but not only a purge. It was also an attempt at transforming the system
established  after  1949  and  also  the  minds  of  the  young  people  through  a  staged
“revolution”,  with  the  assumed  risk  of  civil  war.  Altogether,  it  was  an  attempt  at
securing the revolutionary character of the regime in order to guarantee Mao’s role in
history even after his death. 
9 It  began with a spectacular form of political  violence,  that of  the Red Guards,  high
school and university students encouraged by Mao to fight his “enemies”, starting with
the old  culture  represented by  their  teachers,  school  principals  and all  established
intellectuals, professors, writers and artists. The model proposed to them was that of
the Hunan Peasant Movement as described in Mao’s Report already mentioned. At that
time (May to October 1966), only students of “good” class backgrounds were allowed to
take part, and among them the children of leaders or cadres of the Party and the Army
were considered as natural leaders. The violence and the cruelty that they exhibited in
the way they treated people as well  as all  kinds of monuments and works of art is
incredible.  The first  teacher who was killed by her students on August 5,  1966 was
beaten and tortured for long hours by girls aged about 13 to 15 years. Some of the Red
Guards in this school were daughters of high leaders. The collective fanaticism of these
young people was encouraged by Mao who “reviewed” twelve million of them in eight
mass meetings organised on Tiananmen Square during the first few months. Quite a
number  of  famous  writers  and  artists  were  killed  or  committed  suicide  to  evade
unbearable humiliations and tortures, and many other less known teachers and people
of bad “class origin” (whose names and addresses were provided by the police to the
Red Guards) met the same fate. The cruelty of those urban and educated young people
of the higher strata has been a topic of discussion for Chinese intellectuals and foreign
scholars.  It  shows  without  doubt  that  human  morality  is  quite  dependent  upon  a
civilised environment and formal social and legal restrictions. When those are absent,
collective violence can become uncontrollable, especially when those who would refuse
to participate could very well become themselves victims of it. 
10 But,  for  Mao,  terrorising  intellectuals  and  people  of  bad  class  origins  was  but  an
appetiser.  There  were  more  important  targets,  namely  most  of  the  Party  leaders,
especially those linked with Liu Shaoqi, Number 2 of the Party, as well as the whole
bureaucracy accused of being revisionist. To attack them, Mao could not rely on the
first  Red  Guards  who  happened  to  be  the  children  of  the  new  targets.  He  then
encouraged  the  emergence  of  a  new  breed  of  Red  Guards  called  the  Rebels  who
specialised in attacking political leaders. At the end of the year, celebrating his 73rd
birthday with the group of  close affiliates whom he had suddenly promoted to the
higher positions, he proposed a toast to the coming “nationwide all-round civil war”.
And indeed, this is what happened the next year. 
11 I cannot describe here all the forms of political violence that erupted in 1967 and 1968.
But briefly, the scenario was that of young rebels attacking all official institutions and
trying to “seize power” as ordered by Mao, and entering into bloody fighting because
different  groups  claimed the  same powers.  Generally,  it  ended  by  a  fight  to  death
between two rival groups, hating each other and embroiled in endless revenge actions.
Since all of them claimed to represent Mao’s revolutionary line, Mao decided to let the
Army intervene to support the Left against the Right. But who was left and who was
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right? The army leaders made a choice and repressed all those who did not obey them.
But  Mao  did  not  want  the  revolution  to  be  transformed  into  a  simple  military
dictatorship. It happened also that different army units supported rival groups. The
danger was then that the army itself would be embroiled in violent infighting. Mao
then prohibited the army from using their weapons. As a result, the enemies of the
military local leaders attacked the army, stole their weapons and used them against
their  enemies  among  the  rebels  and  even  against  the  army  itself.  Armed  fighting
between rival rebel groups cost many lives of young people, all of them, on both sides,
convinced that they were giving their lives for Chairman Mao. Some army leaders had
to go into hiding to save their lives. In Wuhan, there was a rebellion of the army against
a leader sent by the Central Group of the Cultural Revolution representing Mao himself.
Although this  was  repressed,  the  situation  became so  chaotic  that  Mao  decided  to
authorise  the  army  to  use  their  weapons  and  restore  order.  This  was  done  very
violently by the army leaders and by the Party leaders who had been able to retain
their posts. 
12 A new mass movement, the Cleansing of the class ranks, was launched to get rid of the
Rebels who had thought that they were fighting Mao’s enemies and were now killed by
them with Mao’s benediction. The number of rebels killed by the army and the local
militias was higher than the number of the victims of the Red Guards and Rebels.
13 It is in this last period that the Cultural Revolution reached the countryside on a large
scale. In some southern provinces, the new movement gave rise to horrible collective
massacres and in some places even to a resurgence of cannibalism motivated by hatred
and a desire to “absorb” the strength of the enemy through his or her body parts like
the heart, the liver and the sexual organs. The victims were all children of the bad
classes, who were the natural targets to obey Mao’s order to “cleanse the class ranks”.
They were killed in broad daylight  and generally  under the leadership of  the local
militia, by people who had been their neighbours and had lived peacefully with them
for  about  eighteen  years  after  the  violence  of  the  Land  Reform.  In  the  cases  of
cannibalism, the meat was often shared collectively in a festive way. One cannibal later
interviewed by a Chinese journalist said that Chairman Mao had said that if we do not
kill the class enemies, they will kill us. He expressed absolutely no regret, felt justified
and discussed his preference for roasted human meat compared to boiled meat. 
14 It is interesting to note that this last period of the most extreme violence corresponded
with the period when Mao’s cult reached the level of quasi-religion. It  seemed that
China had gone back to a primitive stage of human civilisation when rationality was
absent and replaced by blind worship of a pitiless god giving protection only to those
who practiced human sacrifices for him.
 
IV. The necessity of the enemy
15 After this very limited overview of political violence under Mao, I would like to stress
two points. First, political violence was central to Maoism. It was necessary not only
militarily to topple the existing power, but also symbolically to destroy radically the
image  of  the  dominant  people  of  the  old  regime.  Hence  Mao’s  insistence  on  the
necessary  humiliation  of  the  class  enemies  and  the  necessity  to  force  them  to
acknowledge their crimes. It was also necessary to maintain the revolutionary purity of
the regime, to prevent its decay, to “cleanse” it.  What is striking in Mao’s brand of
Mao’s specific brand of political violence
Historians of Asia on Political Violence
5
communism  is  the  fact  that  he  refused  to  turn  the  page  of  the  revolution  and  to
concentrate on economic development and state-building. He felt that his own personal
power  and  his  place  in  history  were  insolubly  linked  to  the  transformation  of  his
country  and  of  his  people  according  to  his  will.  He  could  not  accept  to  become a
manager, a position for which he had no talent, especially compared to other leaders
like Liu Shaoqi or Deng Xiaoping. And to remain a revolutionary, he needed enemies
and political violence. Hence the notion of “continuous revolution” which he defended
during the  Cultural  Revolution.  To continue revolution,  he  needed of  course  “class
enemies” and that is why he promoted the idea of the existence of capitalists at the top
of  the  Party  as  well  as  in  the  rest  of  society,  even  though  there  was  no  possible
economic  or  social  basis  for  the  supposed “bourgeoisie”.  So,  if  continuous  political
violence was a necessity for Mao, this violence was also quite specific. Mao’s special
brand of leadership among the communist leaders of the world was his outstanding
technique of manipulation of the masses for which he had developed a special know-
how during the twenty years of fighting in remote mountainous regions. 
16 It is significant that Carl Schmitt, the once pro-Nazi political thinker, whose main idea
was that the primary question of politics was to define the enemy, was ecstatic about
Mao. In his “Theory of the Partisan”, written in 1963, he presents Mao as the model of
the partisan, for whom hostility is absolute to a point that even Clausewitz would not
have been able to imagine. Schmitt’s knowledge of Chinese history was, however, very
limited (for example, he did not know that the civil war had nothing to do with guerilla
warfare, but was a war between two regular armies), and his vision of Mao was very
much influenced by the French general Raoul Salan, who had tried to account for the
French defeat of Dien Bien Phu by highlighting the use of Mao’s guerilla warfare tactics
by  the  Vietnamese  revolutionary  army.  Still,  it  is  true  that  Mao had spent  his  life
reflecting on the way to defeat enemies through all sorts of means.
 
V. The question of responsibility
17 Finally,  I  would  like  to  raise  an  often  overlooked  question:  What  is  the  personal
responsibility  of  Mao  Zedong  in  the  appalling  violence  of  post-1949  and  especially
post-1966 China? Sometimes, there is a tendency to exonerate him under the pretext
that  he  did  not  order  directly  all  the  evil  actions  perpetrated  at  that  time.  The
responsibility, then, was that of the people who perpetrated them. This, in my view, is
an erroneous conception, and I would argue that, in fact, Mao can be considered as
more criminal than his fellow tyrants of the 20th century: Stalin and Hitler. There are
two reasons to justify my argument. Both are closely linked:
Instead of entrusting specialised institutions with the task of implementing his repressive
orders against all kinds of enemies, Mao enrolled the population at large in this task through
so-called mass movements in which ordinary people were to denounce verbally, and in some
cases, attack physically the enemies designated rather vaguely by himself. The consequence
was  that  many  more  people  became  perpetrators  than  in  the  institutional  model,  and
victims were also  more numerous than if  they had been clearly  chosen by Mao and by
repressive organs, because the people entrusted with the repressive tasks (ordinary people,
activists, or local cadres) were eager to show their zeal, either to advance their career or
simply  to  avoid  being  themselves  considered  as  suspect.  They  had  then  an  inevitable
tendency to be over-zealous.
1. 
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As a result, not only more people perpetrated evil, and even criminal actions, but the social
traumas were  more difficult,  in  fact  impossible,  to  cure.  In  the  Maoist  model,  in  which
former perpetrators often became victims in the next round, hatred and hopes for revenge
became predominant  in  the  society.  Grievances  of  almost  everyone against  everyone in
neighbourhoods,  work  units  and  even  families  were  too  complicated  to  allow  for
acknowledgement of past wrong doings and reconciliation.
18 If we take the example of the Cultural Revolution, we can see that, as a result of Mao’s
fake revolution, most of the population was engulfed in a maelstrom of violence where
many  had  to  play  the  part  that  was  written  down  for  them  by  Mao,  either  as
perpetrators, victims or, very often, both alternately. Many urban young people were
first  transformed into  fascist  thugs  beating  and  killing  the  intellectual  elite  of  the
country, and later into guerrilla fighters killing each other in senseless factional armed
struggles, before being imprisoned and/or massacred by army people and militias. In
many villages and small towns, rural people were engulfed in collective massacres that
were a form of genocide of the “bad class” survivors. The traumas left by this period
have  never  been  healed,  and  this  is  not  only  because  the  leaders  were  afraid  of
damaging the legitimacy of the Party, but also because many people could not face
their own past or were afraid of opening the pandora’s box of pent-up hatred. 
19 As  for  the  question  of  the  sharing  of  responsibility  between  Mao  and  the  other
participants of  the Cultural  Revolution,  Mao’s responsibility is  largely predominant,
even if no one can be exonerated of his or her individual evil actions. Since some time
already,  a  few  former  Red  Guards  have  expressed  remorse  and  asked  for  the
forgiveness of their victims. This was first done privately, but later publicly. And there
were open discussions about the topic. Those who were against confessing wrongdoings
and expressing remorse argued that it was meaningless to express remorse when the
leaders of the time and the present leaders never expressed any. Indeed, some victims
were privately rehabilitated at the beginning of the 1980s, but that was all. There was
no apology from the Party, which tried very hard to prevent study and discussion of
this period.
20 The responsibility  of  young people who had been raised from childhood in a  blind
worship of Mao and in the hatred of “class enemies” cannot be compared to that of the
half-god dictator who organised all the violence. But, of course, Red Guards who have
unjustly harmed people should express remorse. In its process of civilisation, humanity
can only rely on individual  responsibility  and absolute moral  principles.  But,  many
historical events show that human moral progress is fragile and can be reverted if a
civilised environment is not protected. Recently, two researchers have argued that the
Red  Guard  movement  was  a  Stanford  Prison Experiment  in  real-life  size.  In  this
psychology experiment, Professor Zimbardo divided ordinary students into prisoners
and prison officers. The experiment had to be called off after a few days because it
could have ended badly as a result of an excessive identification of the students with
the role they were attributed. It showed that in specific circumstances, ordinary people
could  behave  badly  as  a  result  of  the  power  given  to  them.  This  reinforces  the
argument  against  Mao,  because  it  shows  the  importance  of  the  context  on  human
behaviour. During the Cultural Revolution, the responsibility of the totalitarian system
(and then of its Great Helmsman and of those who supported him) was clearly essential.
That is why the Gao brothers’ statue of Mao kneeling and begging for forgiveness from
the  Chinese  people  is  extremely  symbolic.  Even  if  it  is  shocking  for  the  immense
2. 
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majority of the Chinese, from a historical point of view it seems much more reasonable
than Mao’s portrait hanging at the top of the Tian’anmen rostrum or his statues still
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